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extremely large disasters have a negative effect on output, both in the short and 
long run. However, this result appears in two events where radical political 
revolutions followed the natural disasters. Once these political changes are 
controlled for, even extremely large disasters do not display any significant effect 
on economic growth. It is also found that smaller, but still very large natural 
disasters, have no discernible effect on output. 
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Large sudden natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, and ﬂoods generate de-
struction on impact. Recent events such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, hurricane Katrina in
2005, and the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes in 2010 have received worldwide media coverage,
and there is an increasing sense of awareness among the general public about the destructive nature
of disasters. Much research in both the social and natural sciences has been devoted to increasing
our ability to predict disasters; while the economic research on natural disasters and their conse-
quences is fairly limited.2 In this paper we contribute to close this gap by carefully examining the
causal effect of large natural disaster occurrence on gross domestic output, both in the short and
long run.
Growth theory does not have a clear-cut answer on the question of whether natural dis-
asters should affect economic growth. Traditional neo-classical growth models predict that the
destruction of capital (physical or human) does not affect the rate of technological progress and
hence, it might only enhance short-term growth prospects as it drives countries away from their
balanced-growth steady states. In contrast, endogenous growth models provide less clear-cut pre-
dictions with respect to output dynamics. For example, models based on Schumpeter’s creative
destruction process may even ascribe higher growth as a result of negative shocks, as these shocks
can be catalysts for re-investment and upgrading of capital goods (see, for example, Caballero and
Hammour (1994). In contrast, AK-type endogenous growth models in which technology exhibits
constant returns to capital predict no change in the growth rate following a negative capital shock;
while endogenous growth models that exploit increasing returns to scale in production generally
predict that a destruction of part of the physical or human capital stock results in a lower growth
path and consequently a permanent deviation from the previous growth trajectory.
Thus, the question of whether natural disasters affect economic growth is ultimately an
empirical one; precisely the one we address in this study.3 Few papers have attempted to answer
this question, and althought the evidence is pointing towards the conclusion that large natural
disasters negatively affect economic growth in the short term, it is still inconclusive (see Cavallo
2 In two recent papers, Barro (2006 and 2009) has shown that the infrequent occurrence of economic disasters has
much larger welfare costs than continuous economic ﬂuctuations of lesser amplitude. However, we still do not know
much about the aggregate effects of natural disasters.
3 Themacroeconomicliteraturegenerallydistinguishesbetweenshort-runeffects(usuallyuptoﬁveyears), andlonger-
run effects (anything beyond that horizon). The ﬁrst recent attempt to empirically describe short-run macroeconomic
dynamics following natural disasters is Albala-Bertrand (1993). In a related literature, Kahn (2004) and Kellenberg
and Mobarak (2008) study the relationship between economic development and vulnerability to natural disasters. Yang
(2008) studies the impact of hurricanes on international ﬁnancial ﬂows.
2and Noy (2009)). Furthermore, the bulk of the empirical evidence available focuses only on short-
run effects.4
We contribute to this literature by bringing a new methodological approach to answer the
question of sign and size of the short and long run effects of large natural disasters on economic
growth. In particular, following Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010), we pursue a compar-
ative event study approach, taking advantage of the fact that the timing of a large sudden natural
disaster is an exogenous event. The idea is to construct an appropriate counterfactual—i.e., what
would have happened to the path of gross domestic product (GDP) of the affected country in the
absence of natural disasters—and to assess the disaster’s impact by comparing the counterfactual
to the actual path observed. Importantly, the counterfactuals are not constructed by extrapolating
pre-event trends from the affected countries but rather, following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003),
by building a synthetic control group—i.e., using as a control group other unaffected countries
that, optimally weighted, estimate the missing counterfactual of interest. Given the macro nature
of the question we investigate, we believe this methodology provides the best feasible identiﬁca-
tion strategy for our parameter of interest. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper that
applies this quasi-experimental design to a topic within the economic growth literature.
In the cross-country comparative case studies we describe here, we compare countries af-
fected by natural disasters to a group of unaffected countries. The analysis is only feasible when
some countries are exposed and others are not. Thus, we focus our analysis only on large events,
rather than on recurrent events that are prevalent everywhere. Moreover, the methodology requires
that we can trace the evolution of the outcome variable for several years after the event. For that
reason, we limit the sample to disasters that occur before the year 2000. In addition, we adapt the
synthetic control methods developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond
and Hainmueller (2010) to combine information from several large disasters.
From the outset, we stress that we are not testing among alternative growth theories of the
relationship between natural disasters and economic growth. Instead, we attempt to rigorously
establish the direction and magnitude of the average causal effect of large natural disasters on
economic growth, which is an important piece of evidence not yet conclusively established in the
literature.
Our results show that only very large disasters—whereby “large” is deﬁned in relation to
the distribution of direct damages caused by natural events—display an impact on GDP growth in
the affected countries, both in the short and long run. The effects are both statistically signiﬁcant
andeconomicallymeaningful. Forexample, tenyearsafterthedisaster, theaverageGDPpercapita
4 For example, using a Panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework on a sample of low income countries, Raddatz
(2007) ﬁnds that natural disasters have an adverse short-run impact on output dynamics. Noy (2009) ﬁnds a similar
result exploiting cross country variability by means of the Hausman-Taylor random effects estimator. See Cavallo and
Noy (2009) for a detailed survey of this literature.
3of the affected countries is (on average) 10 percent lower than it was at the time of the disaster,
whereas it would be about 18 percent higher in the counterfactual scenario in which the disaster
had not occurred. However, these large effects are all driven by events that were followed by
radical political revolution (these are the cases of the Islamic Iranian Revolution and the Sandinista
Nicaraguan Revolution, both in 1979). Those events not followed by radical political changes do
not show signiﬁcant subsequent effects on economic growth. For milder events, we do not ﬁnd
evidence of any signiﬁcant impact on GDP growth either in the short or long-run.
Thus, we ﬁnd that only very large natural disasters followed by radical political revolution
show long-lasting negative economic effects on economic growth. Even very large natural disas-
ters, when not followed by disruptive political reforms that alter the economic system, including
the system or property rights, do not display signiﬁcant effects on economic growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical methodology and
Section 3 describes the data. Results are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions follow.
2 Empirical Methodology
Identiﬁcation of the causal effect of natural disasters on economic growth is difﬁcult. Estimates
of the effect of natural disasters on GDP exploiting cross-sectional variability are likely to be
severely biased upward (in absolute value) due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, the magnitude of
natural disasters is larger among poor countries. Though stratifying the analysis by income level
might help to attenuate this omitted variable bias, it can hardly be argued that it would solve the
problem.
A natural solution is to rely on longitudinal data to control for time-invariant unobservable
variables. Nevertheless, exploiting within-country variability requires that the group of countries
that are not shocked by natural disasters (i.e., the control group) allow us to estimate what would
have been the growth rates of the affected countries (i.e., the treatment group) in the absence
of the shocks. Unfortunately, this assumption is generally difﬁcult to satisfy. If, for example,
the countries in the control group, on average, were to grow at a faster rate than those affected by
naturaldisastersevenintheabsenceoftheseshocks, paneldataestimateswillalsotendtobebiased
upward (in absolute value). One can attempt to control for the differential trends across countries
by controlling for country-speciﬁc trends in the econometric model. This entails extrapolating to
the post-shock period the pre-shock trends, which is a strong assumption, especially over long-
periods of time.
Essentially, to overcome the problems of identiﬁcation outlined above, we need to ﬁnd a
group of countries that: a) have had the same secular trends in the dependent variable analyzed
and b) likely would have had the same secular behavior in the absence of the shocks studied.
We can then use this group to estimate the counterfactual and conduct a causal analysis. We do
4this by adopting a novel methodological approach: comparative case studies. This approach is
more general than the ﬁxed-effects model commonly applied in the empirical literature. The ﬁxed-
effects model allows for the presence of unobserved confounders but restricts the effect of those
confounders to be constant in time. Instead, the approach we adopt here allows the effects of
confounding unobserved characteristics to vary with time. Below we describe this approach in
detail.
2.1 Estimating the Impact of Large Disasters with Comparative Case Studies
Case studies focus on particular occurrences of the interventions of interest. In a case study one
is usually interested in ﬁnding the effects of an event or policy intervention on some outcome of
interest. In a cross-country comparative case study, we compare countries affected by the event of
interest (in our case a large natural disaster) to a group of unaffected countries. We ﬁrst focus on
establishing some notation to evaluate the effect of a large disaster for a single country. We will
later aggregate the country speciﬁc effects into an average effect.
We observe J C 1 countries. Without loss of generality, let the ﬁrst country be the one
exposed to a large natural disaster, so that we have J remaining countries that serve as potential
controls or “donors.” In comparative case studies it is assumed that the treated unit is uninter-
ruptedly exposed to treatment after some initial intervention period. In our case we consider the
occurrence of the catastrophic event as the initiation of the intervention period (which includes the
disaster’s aftermath).
Following Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010), let Y N
it be the GDP per capita that
would be observed for country i at time t in the absence of the disaster, for countries i D
1;:::::;J C 1, and time periods t D 1;:::::;T. Let T0 be the number of periods before the dis-
aster, with 1  T0 < T. Let Y I
it be the outcome that would be observed for country i at time t
if country i is exposed to the disaster and its aftermath from period T0 C 1 to T. Of course, to
the extent that the occurrence of a large disaster is unpredictable, it has no effect on the outcome
before the intervention, so for t 2 f1;:::::::;T0g and all i 2 f1;::::::;Ng; we have that Y I
it D Y N
it .5
Let it D Y I
it   Y N
it be the effect of the disaster for country i at time t, if country i is
exposed to the intervention in periods T0 C 1;T0 C 2;::::::;T (where 1  T0 < T). Note that
we allow this effect to potentially vary over time. Again, the intervention, in our context, is the





it C it (1)
5 The assumed unpredictability of natural disasters is not inconsistent with the fact that some countries are more
prone than others to suffer natural disasters. In a sense this risk is already discounted and may inﬂuence the steady-
state growth rate of the country. But, conditional on this underlying propensity, the speciﬁc timing of occurrence is
unpredictable.
5Let Dit be an indicator that takes value one if country i is exposed to the intervention at time t,
and value zero otherwise. The observed output per capita for country i at time t is
Yit D Y
N
it C itDit (2)
Because only the ﬁrst country (country “one”) is exposed to the intervention and only after period
T0 (with 1  T0 < T), we have that:
Dit D
(
1 if i D 1 and t > T0
0 otherwise
Ourparametersofinterestare.1;T0C1;::::::;1;T/;thelead-speciﬁccausaleffectofthecatastrophic





1t D Y1t   Y
N
1t (3)
Note that Y I
1t is observed. Therefore, to estimate 1t we will only need to come up with an estimate
for Y N
1t .
Suppose that Y N
it is given by a factor model:
Y
N
it D t C tZi C ti C "it (4)
where t is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across countries, Zi is a
.r 1/ vector of observed predictors for GDP per capita (not affected by the natural disaster), t is
a .1r/ vector of unknown parameters, t is a .1F/ vector of unobserved common factors, i
is an .F  1/ vector of unknown factor loadings, and the error terms "it are unobserved transitory
GDP per capita shocks at the country level with zero mean for all i and t. This model does not rule
out the existence of time-varying measured determinants of Y N
it . The vector Zi may contain pre-
and post-disaster values of time-varying variables, as long as they are not affected by the disaster.
The most widely used version of this model in the literature assumes constant effects for each
regressor and simpliﬁes to the following model:
Y
N
it D t C Zit C ti C "it
Moreover, this boils down to the simpler ﬁxed-effects model if t is constant for all t. This
restricted model could be easily estimated by a difference-in-differences estimator.
6Now, consider a .J  1/ vector of weights W D .w2;:::::;wJC1/
0 such that wj  0 for
j D 2;:::::::;J C 1 and w2 C w3 C ::::: C wJC1 D 1: Each particular value of the vector W
represents a potential synthetic control, that is, a particular weighted average of control countries.
The real GDP per capita for each synthetic control indexed by W is:
JC1 X
jD2































jZj D Z1 (7)












































Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) show that, under standard conditions, the right hand
side of this equation will be close to zero (in expectation) if the number of pre-disaster periods is
large relative to the scale of ". Therefore, they suggest using






for t 2 fT0 C 1;::::::::::;Tg as an estimator of 1t.
The system of equations in (5), (6) and (7) can hold exactly only if .Y1;1;::::::::;Y1;T0IZ0
1/












7In practice, it is often the case that no set of weights exists such that these equations hold exactly
in the data. Then, the synthetic control country will be selected so that they hold approximately.
2.2 Computational Issues
The outcome variable of interest, say GDP per capita, is observed for T periods for the country
affected by the catastrophic event Y1t;.t D 1;::::::;T/ and the unaffected countries Yjt;.j D
2;:::::;J C 1It D 1;:::::;T/. Let T1 D T   T0 be the number of available post-disaster pe-
riods. Let Y1 be the .T1  1/ vector of post-disaster outcomes for the exposed country, and
Y0 be the .T1  J/ matrix of post-disaster outcomes for the potential control countries. Let





sD1 ksYis. Consider M of such linear combinations deﬁned by the vectors K1;::::::;KM.





1 /0 be a .k 1/ vector of pre-disaster output linear combinations and
output predictors not affected by the disaster for the exposed country, with k D r CM. Similarly,
let X0 be a .k  J/ matrix that contains the same variables for the unaffected countries. That is,






The vector W  is chosen to minimize some distance, kX1   X0W k, between X1 and X0W ,
subject to w2  0;:::::;wJC1  0 and
PJC1
jD2 w
j D 1. In particular, we will consider
kX1   X0W kV D
p
.X1   X0W /0V.X1   X0W /
where V is a .k  k/ symmetric and positive semideﬁnite matrix.
Although this inferential procedure is valid for any choice of V , the choice of V inﬂuences
the mean square error of the estimator (that is, the expectation of .Y1   Y0W /0.Y1   Y0W /).
The optimal choice of V assigns weights to a linear combination of the variables in X0 and X1
to minimize the mean square error of the synthetic control estimator. The choice of V can also
be data-driven. One possibility is to choose V such that the resulting synthetic control country
approximates the trajectory of the outcome variable of the affected country as well as outcome
predictors in the pre-disaster periods. Indeed, we will choose V such that the mean squared pre-
diction error of the outcome variable is minimized for the pre-intervention periods. One obvious
















This would in essence include the entire pre-disaster output per capita path as input to build the
synthetic control. Alternatively, we can use the ﬁrst half of the pre-disaster trend outcomes to
























we are more conﬁdent in its ability to replicate the counterfactual trajectory.
In this paper, we extend the idea in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) generalizing
the placebo approach to produce quantitative inference in comparative case studies. We now dis-
cuss how to combine the placebo effects to account for the fact that we will be interested in doing
inference about the average (normalized) effect found across the country speciﬁc comparative case
studies of each disaster.7
Recall our lead speciﬁc estimates of the disaster on the country of interest (say, country 1)
are denoted by .b 1;T0C1;::::::;b 1;T/ for leads 1;2;:::::;T   T0, Now consider taking the average
disaster effect across G disasters of interest, say, the G largest disasters. Assume for simplicity
that for all these G disasters we are able to compute the T   T0 lead speciﬁc estimates of disaster
impact. Then the estimated average effect for the G largest disasters is given by






2.3 Statistical Signiﬁcance of Estimated Effects
The standard errors commonly reported in regression-based comparative case studies measure un-
certainty about aggregate data. This mode of inference would logically produce zero standard
errors if aggregate data were used for estimation. However, perfect knowledge of the value of
aggregate data does not reduce to zero our uncertainty about the parameter of interest: the effect of
a large disaster on output per capita. Not all uncertainty about the value of the estimated parame-
ters come from lack of knowledge of aggregate data. In comparative case studies such as ours, an
additional source of uncertainty derives from our ignorance about the ability of the control group
6 This period varies across countries, depending on when the disaster occurs relative to the earliest year in our sample.
7 We match each country with its synthetic counterpart using the path of GDP per capita. Therefore, the estimated
country speciﬁc effect of the disaster is measured as the difference in the actual and counterfactual evolution of GDP
per capita. Thus, the size of the effect depends on the level of GDP per capita. The same decline in GDP per capita will
be more important in a poorer than in a richer country. Given these scale effects, we need to normalize the estimates
before pooling the country speciﬁc results to come up with the average effect of a disaster. We normalize by setting
the GDP per capita of the affected country (for each of the disasters we consider) to be equal to 1, in the disaster year.
9to reproduce the counterfactual. There is some uncertainty about how the affected country would
have evolved in the absence of the disaster. Large sample inferential techniques are not well-suited
for comparative case studies when the number of units in the comparison group and the number of
periods in the sample are relatively small. Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie,
DiamondandHainmueller(2010), weuseexactinferentialtechniques, similartopermutationtests,
to conduct inference in comparative case studies. These methods allow for valid inference regard-
less of the number of available donor countries and the number of available pre-disaster periods.
However, the quality of inference increases with the number of donor countries or the number of
available time periods.
As in classical permutation tests, we apply the synthetic control method to every potential
control in our sample. This allows us to assess whether the effect estimated by the synthetic
control for the country affected by the disaster is large relative to the effect estimated for a country
chosen at random (which was not exposed to a large disaster). This inferential exercise is exact in
the sense that, regardless of the number of available comparison countries and time periods, it is
always possible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect of the placebo disasters.
More generally, this inferential exercise examines whether or not the estimated effect of an actual
natural disaster is large relative to the distribution of the effects estimated for the countries not
exposed to such disasters. More formally, assume that we are engaging in inference about negative
point estimates at every lead (every year in the disaster’s aftermath). We can then compute a



























1;l is the lead l-speciﬁc effect of a disaster when donor country j is assigned a placebo-
disaster at the same time as country 1. b 
PL.j/
1;l is computed following the same procedure outlined
above for b 1;l. By computing b 
PL.j/
1;l for every country j in the donor pool for country 1, we
can characterize the distribution of placebo effects and assess how the estimate b 1;l ranks in that
distribution.
Now, to conduct valid inference for  we need to account for the fact that the average
smooths out some noise. We then construct a distribution of average placebo effects according to
the following steps:
1. For each disaster g of interest we compute all the placebo effects using the available donors
jg D 2;::::::;Jg C 1 corresponding to disaster g
2. At each lead, we compute every possible placebo average effect by picking a single placebo
estimate corresponding to each disaster g; and then taking the average across the G placebos.
10There are many possible placebo averages:




Let us index all these possible placebo averages by np D 1;::::;NPL This number grows
very quickly in G and the typical Jg:
3. We rank the actual lead speciﬁc average disaster effect l in the distribution of NPL average
placebo effects (This involves NPL comparisons)





































We exploit a comprehensive dataset of 196 countries covering the period 1970-2008. The data
on real GDP per capita at purchasing power parities (PPP) comes from the World Bank World
Development Indicators (WDI). Following a voluminous empirical growth literature (see, among
others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)), and attempting to
maximize the pre-event ﬁt of the models, the GDP predictors (i.e., vector Zi in equation 4) we
use are (i) Trade Openness (real exports plus real imports over real GDP), from WDI; (ii) Capital
Stock computed through the perpetual inventory method using data from the Penn World Tables
(PWT); 8 (iii) Land Area (in Km2); (iv) Population; (v) Secondary Education Attainment, from
Lutz, Goujon and Sanderson (2007), (vi) Latitude (in absolute value); and (vii) Polity 2 which is
an aggregate indicator of democracy, from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
8 We construct series for capital stock using data from the PWT. Total investment in PPP terms is obtained by mul-
tiplying the PPP adjusted investment ratios to GDP (ki) by real GDP per capita (rgdpl) and population (pop). Then,
following the methodology presented in Easterly and Levine (2001), the perpetual inventory method is used to con-
struct the capital stock.
11The data on natural disasters and their human and economic impacts is from the EM-DAT
database collected by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the
Catholic University of Louvain. The EM-DAT database has worldwide coverage, and contains
data on the occurrence and effects of natural disasters from 1900 to the present.9 CRED deﬁnes
a disaster as a natural event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request for external
assistance. For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT database at least one of the following
criteria must be fulﬁlled: (1) 10 or more people has to be reported killed; (2) 100 people has to be
reported affected; (3) state of emergency is declared; and/or (4) international assistance is called
for. These disasters can be hydro-meteorological disasters including ﬂoods, wave surges, storms,
droughts, landslides and avalanches; geophysical disasters including earthquakes, tsunamis and
volcanic eruptions; and biological disasters covering epidemics and insect infestations (though
these are much less frequent).
The EM-DAT database includes three measures of the magnitude of the disaster: (1) the
number of people killed; (2) the number of people affected; and (3) the amount of direct damage
(measured in United States dollars).10 Since we presume that the impact of a speciﬁc natural disas-
ter on the economy depends on the magnitude of the disaster relative to the size of the economy, we
standardize the three disaster measures. We divide the measures for the number of people killed or
affected by the population size in the year prior to the disaster; and divide the direct cost measure
of the disaster by the previous year’s GDP.
In our econometric analysis in the next section we rely on the variable “number of people
killed” (divided by total population) to deﬁne the magnitude of the natural disasters. Moreover, we
focus primarily on the three types of disasters which are more common and for which the data is
more reliable: earthquakes (including tsunamis), ﬂoods and windstorms.
There are a total of 6,530 events recorded in the database between 1970 and 2008, of which
47.4 percent are ﬂoods, 40.1 percent are storms and 12.5 percent are earthquakes (Table 1). Often
times there is more than one event recorded on a given country-year. In those cases we add up the
corresponding disaster magnitudes and deﬁne a “combined” disaster for that country-year. From a
ﬁrst look at the data, disasters are fairly common. Out of a total of (39 x 196 =) 7644 year-country
observations, 34 percent (that is, 2597 observations) meet the requirements to be designated as a
natural disaster. In turn, these events are distributed between storms (29 percent), ﬂoods (38%) and
“combined” (26%). Earthquakes are much less frequent (7% of the country-year observations).
Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 1, there is a positive trend in the prevalence of total
events over the sample period. However, this trend is somewhat deceptive as it appears to be driven
9 The data are publicly available at: http://www.cred.be/
10 The amount of damage reported in the database consists only of direct damages (e.g., damage to infrastructure,
crops, housing) and does not include indirect or secondary damages.
12Table 1. Distribution of Disaster Type 1970 - 2008
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EM-DAT.
by improved recording of mild events, rather than by an increase in the frequency of occurrence
of total events.11 Furthermore, truly large events—i.e., conceivably more catastrophic—are rare.
Both of these facts are shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 where we restrict the sample only to large
events, and where “large” is deﬁned in relation to the world mean of direct damage caused by
natural disasters.12 As it is evident from Figure 1, there is no time trend for the subset of large
events. Moreover, the frequency of occurrence of “large” disasters is signiﬁcantly smaller than
that of all events (right vs. left scales in Figure 1; see also Table 2). This suggests that there is
a high incidence of small disasters in the sample or, more precisely, that the threshold for what
constitutes a disaster (and hence gets recorded in the dataset) is quite lenient.
It is important to notice that many of the events that are recorded in the dataset do not
correspond to the catastrophic notion of natural disaster that one has in mind when thinking about
the potential effect of natural disasters on the macro-economy. Therefore we will be focusing
on disasters whose magnitudes are particularly large according to some precise thresholds to be
deﬁned below.
3.2 Deﬁning Large Disasters
Our treatment effects methodology requires us to have a binary treatment indicator for the occur-
rence of a disaster. As a ﬁrst approximation, we could deﬁne a large disaster as one in which
11 See Cavallo and Noy (2009) for a discussion of this issue.
12 Here, a "large" disaster occurs when its incidence, measured in terms of people killed as a share of population, is
greater than the world pooled mean for the entire sample period.
13Table 2. Distribution of Disaster Type (large events) 1970 - 2008
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EM-DAT.
Note: Large events refers to events whose intensity is above the mean of the
respective normalized distribution of number of people killed.
Figure 1. Increasing Prevalence of Natural Disasters 1970 - 2007
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EM-DAT.
Note: Large events refers to the events which their intensity is above the mean
of the normalized killed distribution.
14Figure 2. Distribution of Disasters Magnitudes
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EM-DAT.
the magnitude is more than, for example, 2 standard deviations above the country-speciﬁc mean.
Note, however, that we are interested in large disasters where “large” is deﬁned from a world wide
perspective. While a given disaster might be large relative to the history of disasters within the
country, it may be small in a more global context. Then, it is better to deﬁne a large disaster using
the pooled world-wide mean. In this case, a disaster would be large when its magnitude exceeds
2 standard deviations above the world mean.13 In Figure 2 we present the distribution of disaster
magnitudes.
Since the distribution is so skewed, the mean (plus one or two standard deviations) is a poor
indicator of location, so we use a percentile-based deﬁnition of “large disaster.” Thus, we consider
the 99th, 90th and 75th percentiles of the world distribution of the number of people killed (as
a share of population) as cutoff values that deﬁne a large disaster. The 99th percentile cutoff is
equivalent to a natural disaster that kills more than 233 people per million inhabitants. Although
the number is large, many recent large events have exceeded this rate. For example, the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami killed 772 people per million inhabitants in Indonesia, and almost 2,000
per million inhabitants in Sri Lanka. Moreover, by the latest accounts, the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti killed over 20,000 people per million inhabitants (see Cavallo, Powell and Becerra (2010)).
The 90th percentile cutoff is equivalent to a natural disaster that kills approximately 17 people
per million inhabitants. For example, this is within the estimated mortality range of the 2010
earthquake in Chile. Finally, the 75th percentile cutoff corresponds to a natural disaster that would
13 In the analysis that follows, as is standard in the literature, in order to eliminate potential outliers we exclude data
from countries with population levels below 1 million.
15kill approximately 7 people per million inhabitants. This is approximately the mortality rate of
Hurricane Katrina that struck the United States in 2005.
Furthermore, the methodology we use requires that we can trace the evolution of the out-
come variable for several years after the event. For that reason, we limit the sample to disasters
that occur before the year 2000. Taking this into consideration, we end up with subsamples of 10
natural disasters that are large based on the 99th percentile, 164 natural disasters based on the 90th
percentile, and 444 natural disasters based on the 75th percentile cutoffs, respectively.
However, we do not have full data on the GDP per capita predictors for all these events,
and we were not able to construct valid counterfactuals for all the remaining natural disasters
in our sample (i.e., there are natural disasters for which we could not match the pre-event GDP
trajectory to that of a synthetic control group).14 Thus, the effective number of events in every
subsample ends up being smaller. In particular, we end up with 4 events that are large based on the
99th percentile, 18 events based on the 90th percentile and 22 events based on the 75th percentile
cutoffs respectively. See Appendix Table 1 for the list of events in each category. Finally, note
that for some countries we have several “large disasters” over the sample period. In those cases
we only use data before and after (up to the subsequent disaster) the ﬁrst large disaster observed
during the sample period.15
Obviously, the disaster magnitude as reported in the dataset is a combination of the physical
intensity of the underlying event with the economic conditions of the affected countries.16 Nev-
ertheless, in our view, that is the best estimate of the magitude of the shock to the economy, and
hence the potential causal variable of interest in our study.
Still, it is interesting to examine which of the magnitude variables correlates more with
pure physical measures of disaster intensity such as Richter scale for earthquakes and wind speed
for storms. Unfortunately the disaster intensity data is less readily available so we can perform
the analysis only for a limited set of events.17 The following table shows the correlations between
these physical measures of disasters and our damage measures for disaster magnitude.
Population killed by the disaster correlates better with the exogenous measures in the sense
of having a higher goodness of ﬁt for both measures. Moreover, whether a person was killed is a
more precisely deﬁned event than say, whether a person was affected by the disaster. Also, number
14 Identiﬁcation relies heavily on matching the pre-treatment secular behavior of the outcome variable of interest.
Thus, discarding from the analysis the unmatched events is similar to conﬁning the analysis to the common support
when using matching estimators.
15 Then, when deﬁning large disasters according to the different percentile cutoffs, what qualiﬁes as a ﬁrst disaster
for a highest percentile cutoff does not necessarily coincide with what qualiﬁes as ﬁrst disaster for a lower percentile
cutoff.
16 Though this would be obviously problematic in a cross-country analysis, our methodology not only controls for
unobserved permanent effects among countries (ﬁxed effects models) but also for time-varying effects.
17 Information taken from the database of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
http://www.noaa.gov/.
16Table 3. Physical and Damage Measures of Disasters Magnitude Variables
Disaster Level Data
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EM-DAT.
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
of people killed is more comparable across countries than value-based measures. We will then use
number of people killed as our disaster magnitude variable when selecting a pool of large disasters.
4 Results
In this section we present our estimates of the average causal impact of large disasters on real
GDP per capita for countries that experienced such large disasters between 1970 and 2000 and that
have the available data required for a comparative case study. Recall that for those countries that
experienced several large disasters only the ﬁrst is used, and their post-disaster data are only used
up to the year preceding the second large disaster (if it occurred).
4.1 Overall Effects
Like in the program evaluation literature, our estimator does not disentangle between direct and
indirect causal effects of the natural disasters on the outcome of interest. It just estimates the
overall average causal effect. Though this is always an important distinction, in our case, however,
it is not clear-cut how to draw the line between those effects. Indeed, it might well be argued that
all of the total effect of natural disasters on economic growth is indirect. With this caveat in mind
we now present our estimates of the overall average causal effects of natural disasters on economic
growth.
Figures 3, 5 and 7 present the average causal impact of a large disaster on real GDP per
capita for the three different deﬁnitions of “large disaster” adopted: P99, P90 and P75. P“X” for
17Figure 3. Large Disasters = above 99 Percentile
Note: Average taken across large disaster countries without missing data.
X D 75;90; and 99 denotes the group of countries exposed to disasters in which the magnitude of
the disaster was above the Xth percentile in the world distribution of disaster damages.
As can be seen, large disasters seem to have a lasting impact on GDP per capita when we
deﬁne a large disaster to be one above the 99th percentile of the magnitude distribution. The effects
are sizable. For example, ten years after the disaster, the GDP per capita of the affected countries is
(on average) 10 percent lower than it was at the time of the disaster, whereas it would be about 18
percent higher in the counterfactual scenario in which the disaster did not occur. Moreover, note
that by extrapolating the pre-disaster trend into post-disaster years to construct the counterfactual,
wewouldbeover-estimatingtheeffectofthedisaster. InFigure4wepresentexactinferenceforthe
results in the P99 group. When computing placebo averages, we reﬁne our inference approach and
include only the averages computed with placebos for which we obtained as good a pre-treatment
ﬁt as the country that they serve as donors for. Thus, this evidence suggest that a natural disaster
would cause, on average, a statistically signiﬁcant decline in GDP per capita in all the 10 years in
its aftermath. The probability of observing such declines by pure chace is close to zero in every
period.
In Figure 5, where we deﬁne a large disaster using the 90th percentile cutoff, we do not
ﬁnd any effect of disasters on output. Actual and counterfactual GDP per capita follow each other
18Figure 4. Adjusted Signiﬁcance Levels for P99
closely, not only before but also after the occurrence of the disaster. Whatever slight difference we
ﬁnd between them, it is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels (see Figure 6).
Again, considering our most lenient deﬁnition of large disaster using the 75th percentile
(P75) cutoff in Figure 7, we do not ﬁnd any effect of disasters on output. As can be seen in Figure
8, none of the differences between the actual and counterfactual GDP per capita are statistically
signiﬁcant.
Taken at face value, these results suggest that only large natural disasters affect, on average,
the subsequent performance of the economy. For example, one could use our results to shed light
on the likely long-term impact of the catastrophic earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12,
2010. By the metric of the number of fatalities as a share of population, the Haiti earthquake
is the most catastrophic event in the modern era, killing as many as ﬁve times more people per
million inhabitants than the worst event in our comprehensive sample (i.e., the 1972 earthquake
in Nicaragua). If Haiti were to experience the average long-term impact of a P99 disaster we
estimate, by 2020 it would have an income per capita of $1,060 while it could have had a per capita
income of about $1,410 had the earthquake not occurred (all ﬁgures in PPP 2008 international
dollars). Instead, the devastating earthquake that struck Chile on February 27th 2010, one of the
strongest earthquakes ever recorded, is also an informative case to consider. According to recent
information from the Chilean government, the earthquake killed 342 people out of a population
of approximately 17 million (this is within the mortality range of our P90 subsample). By our
estimates, such an event is not likely to generate long-term adverse impact on per capita GDP.
19Figure 5. Large Disasters = above 90th Percentile
Note: Average taken across large disaster countries without missing data.
Figure 6. Adjusted Signiﬁcance Levels for P90
20Figure 7. Large Disasters = above 75 Percentile
Note: Average taken across large disaster countries without missing data.
Figure 8. Adjusted Signiﬁcance Levels for P75
21Figure 9. Large Disasters Not Followed by Political Revolutions
4.2 Effects Controlling for Radical Political Revolutions
The overall effects reported above might overstate the likely effect of natural disasters on economic
growth. Two of the four disasters in the ‘treated’ group of very large disasters (i.e., those deﬁned
by the 99th cutoff) were followed by political revolutions. These were the cases of 1979 Islamic
Iranian Revolution, which occurred right after the 1978 earthquake, and the Sandinista revolution
in Nicaragua that deposed the Somoza Dynasty, also in 1979, a few years after the earthquake
that devastated Managua. Though it is possibly that these natural disasters somehow affected the
likelihood of those radical political revolutions, we cannot substantiate such a causal claim.18 Irre-
spective of that, in the structural spirit of analyzing the effect of the natural disasters on economic
growth controlling for the effect of these political revolutions, it is of interest to separate the analy-
sis between the cases where the natural disaster was followed by radical political revolution, which
18 Nevertheless, in the case of Nicaragua, it has been argued that the 1972 earthquake that devastated Managua played
a role in the fall of Somoza. Instead of helping to rebuild Managua, Somoza siphoned off relief money to help pay for
National Guard luxury homes, while the homeless poor had to make do with hastily constructed wooden shacks. This
greatly contributed to eroding the remaining support of Somoza’s regime among many businessmen and the middle
class (see, among others, Merrill 1993). In the case of Iran, the earthquake served the organization of the revolution,
in particular, by having coordinated the organization of Khomeini’s Revolutionary Guard that latter played a key role
in advancing the revolution activities (see Keddie, 2006).
22Figure 10. Large Disasters Followed by Political Revolutions
certainly affected the workingof the economy, as was thecase in Iran and Nicaragua, and those that
were not followed by political revolution, such as the cases of Honduras (1974) and the Dominican
Republic (1979) (see Appendix Table 1).19
Figures 9 and 10 present this analysis. In Figure 9 we observe that when we restrict the
analysis to the subset of large disasters (in the 99th percentile) that were not followed by radical
political revolutions, we ﬁnd no effects of the disaster on GDP per capita either in the short or long
run.
In Figure 10 we observe large long lasting effects of a catastrophic disaster when followed
by radical political revolutions. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the earthquakes in Nicaragua and
Iran produced large and statistically signiﬁcant effects on output per capita. Note, however, that
Nicaragua, after a short-lived (1-year) small but statistically signiﬁcant decline, was fully recover-
ing from the natural disaster (in terms of GDP per capita). However, it dropped again, in a much
more pronounced way, after the Sandinist revolution. This result conﬁrms, once again, the salient
19 Of course, if the disasters did not cause the political change noted, the overall average effect previously estimated
would be biased upward (in absolute value) due to these subsequent negative shocks correlated with the treatment
indicator used in the analysis.
23importance of the political organization of societies in determining their economic performance
(see, among others, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)).
Thus, we ﬁnd that only very large natural disasters followed by radical political revolution
show long-lasting negative economic effects on economic growth. Even very large natural disas-
ters, when not followed by disruptive political reforms that alter the economic system, including
the system or property rights, do not display signiﬁcant effects on economic growth.20
5 Conclusions
We examined the impact of natural disasters on GDP per capita by combining information from
comparative case studies obtained with a synthetic control methodology recently expounded in
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010). The procedure involves identifying the causal effects
by comparing the actual evolution of post-disaster per capita incomes with a counter-factual series
constructed by using synthetic controls.
Our estimates provide new evidence on the short- and long-run per capita income effects
of large natural disasters. Contrary to previous work, we ﬁnd that natural disasters, even when we
focus only on the effects of the largest events, do not have any signiﬁcant effect on subsequent
economic growth. Indeed, the only two cases where we found that truly large natural disasters
were followed by an important decline in GDP per capita were cases where the natural disaster
was followed, though in one case not immediately, by radical political revolution, which severely
affected the institutional organization of society. Thus, we conclude that unless a natural disaster
triggers a radical political revolution, it is unlikely to affect economic growth. Of course, this
conclusion does not neglect the direct cost of natural disasters such as the lives lost and the costs
of reconstruction, which often are quite large.
20 Excluding Iran and Nicaragua from the analysis for the 90th and 75th cutoff points does not change the analysis
signiﬁcantly.
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